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Conflict of Interest Economics and
Investment Analyst Biases-
H. D. Vinod'
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will review and expand upon my past
discussions1 about conflicts of interest within financial markets,
specifically when investment analysts serve both lenders (buy-
side) and borrowers (sell-side). In early 2003, ten Wall Street
securities firms2 agreed to pay $1.4 billion in fines to settle
charges arising from the production of biased research that
supported their investment banking businesses while
misleading ordinary investors. When conflicts of interest in
analysts' reports are considered from the viewpoint of economic
theory, they show that the publicly desirable Nash cooperative
bargaining solution' will not be reached. Although some market
inefficiency is inevitable due to human limitations, the excess
rents that the investment banking businesses earn by
exploiting hidden conflicts of interest can and should be
© 2004 H. D. Vinod. All Rights Reserved.
Hrishikesh Dhundiraj Vinod is a Professor of Economics and Director of
the Institute of Ethics and Economic Policy in the Economics Department at Fordham
University in New York. I thank Anne Edinger and her team of editors at the Brooklyn
Law Review for numerous helpful suggestions.
' See Hrishikesh D. Vinod, Divest Investment Banking from Financial
Institutions (Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Divest Investment Banking], http://ssrn.com/
abstract=323280 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); Hrishikesh D. Vinod, Production Studies
Imply Smart Regulation Can Create Prosperous Telecoms and Prevent Bubbles (Aug.
19, 2002) [hereinafter Production Studies], http://ssrn.com/ abstract=340080 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
See Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2004).
' The Nash equilibrium is a cooperative solution in game theory. See John
Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128-40 (1953) (extending the
axioms from his earlier paper and presenting the optimality property of his cooperative
bargaining solution).
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eliminated. Regulatory solutions, however, involve costly
micromanaging of the internal personnel affairs and
communications within banks and brokerages employing
research analysts. This paper proposes that in addition to
penalties such as large fines and strict regulation, egregious
violators should be divested of these dual roles and broken up
into separate companies, thereby eliminating such conflicts.
This remedy has disadvantages, such as potentially
causing inadequate funding of research. I distinguish between
past data and future prospects research, and conclude that past
data research can and should be made publicly available on the
Internet. Future prospects research, on the other hand, is easy
to appropriate and susceptible to the economic inefficiencies of
free rider and adverse selection. In light of this problem, I
propose novel ways to create high quality, publicly available
future prospects research without subsidies from investment
banks. Finally, I conclude that, despite these difficulties, a
dramatic divestiture will help eliminate conflicts of interest
without detailed and excessive regulation, while the threat of
divestiture will help to prevent future abuses.
Legal practitioners readily accept the separation
between prosecution and defense. Although both sides seek
justice, in an adversarial legal proceeding, ethics do not allow
for the same law firm to provide legal advice to both parties to
a dispute. No one envisions regulating the law firm in such a
way that an imaginary wall can separate lawyers for the
prosecution from lawyers for the defense. This is not a matter
of managing potential conflicts of interest with well-designed
and stringent rules of conduct for lawyers and partners of the
law firm; the distinction between the two sides is too
fundamental to be managed by any such rules. Although it is
possible to design rules that forbid any communication between
the two groups of lawyers, no one seriously suggests such an
approach.
This paper argues that, similar to a law firm, a single
brokerage house advising both the demand and supply side of
the securities market cannot be managed by rules. Just as we
require separate law firms to represent the prosecution and the
defense, we need to require separate firms to advise individual
investors and investment bankers. The past approaches (based
on rules and walls) are doomed to fail, because of the
fundamental nature of the conflict between the buy-side and
the sell-side.
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The inadequacy of the current approach is clear." For
example, almost all major brokerages and banks have broken
rules and circumvented the walls separating their buy-side
from their sell-side. In early 2003, ten Wall Street firms'
settled for a spectacular $1.4 billion after admitting that they
duped ordinary investors by producing biased research that
supported their investment banking clients. In the Enron
example, off-the-book special purpose entities were created
when conflicted investment bankers gave Enron executives
their blessings. It is in the wake of continuing examples such
as these that I reconsider the problem from an economist's
perspective, and conclude that divestiture of such firms into
separate investment banking and retail brokerage/commercial
banking firms is a viable solution.
The background and terminology for this paper are
outlined in Parts II and III. Part IV considers the failures of
securities markets and the implied cost to market efficiency.
' Merrill Lynch internal e-mails reveal that the analysts viewed certain
stocks as junk and yet the firm advised investors to "accumulate" shares in those
companies. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1087 (2003). The SEC has
also warned of analyst abuses, bias, etc. See Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding
Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts of Interest (Apr. 28, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) ("Today
the Commission announced enforcement actions against ten broker-dealers for failing
to ensure that the research they provided their customers was independent and
unbiased by investment banking interests.").
See generally, Divest Investment Banking, supra note 1.
6 The ten firms are: (1) Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. (Bear Stearns) (2) Credit
Suisse First Boston LLC (CSFB) (3) Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Goldman), (4) Lehman
Brothers Inc. (Lehman), (5) J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (J.P. Morgan), (6) Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated (Merrill Lynch), (7) Morgan Stanley &
Co. Incorporated (Morgan Stanley), (8) Citigroup Global Markets Inc. fik/a Salomon
Smith Barney Inc. (SSB), (9) UBS Warburg LLC (UBS) (10) U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray
Inc. (Piper Jaffray). See Press Release, supra note 2. Instead of blowing the whistle,
financial institutions have repeatedly facilitated massive frauds at Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, Parmalat and others. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Agreement with
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Two Executives to Settle Charges of Aiding
and Abetting Enron Accounting Fraud (Dec. 22, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-180.htm (showing an agreement with Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce and two executives to settle charges of aiding and abetting Enron
accounting fraud) (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also Press Release, SEC, Testimony
Concerning Transparent Financial Reporting for Structured Finance Transaction (Dec.
11, 2002), at http:l/www.sec.gov/news/testimony/121102tsan.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2004).
7 Divesting refers to dissolving or breaking up a corporation into two or more
entities with separate managements. The owners of the original corporation usually
own shares in the broken up entities, but they are free to sell shares of those companies
they believe to have low prospects. This remedy is common in antitrust litigation. See
PHILIp AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALySIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 155-56, 158(c),
223-26 (3d ed. 1981).
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Part V seeks insights from economic theory and discusses
recent manifestations of conflicts, as better understood through
application of Axelrod's non zero sum game - the "prisoner's
dilemma." Part VI discusses why market inefficiencies persist
despite attempts to remove them. Part VII discusses the
advantages and challenges of divestiture as a remedy for
conflicts leading to these inefficiencies and failures. In Part
VIII, I draw conclusions and offer final remarks.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Great Depression of 1929 was deeper and longer
lasting due to the bank failures that accompanied it.
Subsequently, Congress decided that one way of preventing
future great depressions was to prevent bank failures through
regulating the use of funds deposited by bank customers. After
the October 1929 crash, the stock market was seen as the most
volatile and risky use of bank deposits. In response, Congress
enacted laws aimed not only at preventing bankers from
speculating in the stock market, but also at avoiding the
conflicts of interest likely to occur when a banker's promotion
of a particular investment actually benefited the bank's clients.
The first legislation to address this growing concern was
the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) of 1933, which differentiated
between investment and commercial banking.9 Key provisions
address the depression era concern that banks should not
speculate with depositors' money.' ° The legislative history
leading up to the GSA mentioned "subtle hazards," reflecting
the fear that conflicts associated with underwriting would
encourage unsound banking practices. These hazards, as
discussed below, proved to be neither subtle nor benign.1"
It wasn't until the 1960s that the primary national bank
regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
tried to expand national bank powers into new areas." In 1971,
in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, the U.S. Supreme Court
8 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND SIMULATED ANNEALING 32-41 (Morgan
Kaufman ed., 1987).
' Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
10 Id. at §§ 16, 20, 21, 32.
See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
See Joseph J. Nbrton, International Banking Law on the Threshold of the
Twenty-First Century, at http://iibf law.smu.edu/pub/nortonla.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2004).
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held (against the OCC) that banks should not offer mutual
funds, citing the GSA, Sections 16 and 21."3 The Court paid
particular attention to the legislative history of the GSA, and to
the "subtle hazards" that Congress intended to prevent. It
found that in addition to the obvious dangers of imprudent
securities investments by banks, these "subtle hazards"
consisted of: (i) banks speculating with depositor money by
investing in securities; (ii) unsound loans made to corporations
to shore up stock market prices; and (iii) bank officials pressing
banking customers to buy securities underwritten by the
bank.4 This decision, while an indicator of the Court's
apprehension, did not predict the extent of the abuses to come.
In recent months, the exposure of insider after-hours trading
and hidden commissions given to brokerage-based mutual fund
promoters has uncovered hidden fees that the Court could not
have imagined in 1971.
In 1985, regulatory actions started to erode the GSA,
culminating in its repeal in 1999. In its place, Congress passed
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) or "The Financial
Modernization Act" of 1999." The GLBA included provisions to
protect consumers' personal financial information held by
financial institutions." It attempted a regulatory approach,
forming a list of activities between commercial and investment
banking that were impermissibly linked - activities referred to
as "bundling" in antitrust law.'7 Unfortunately, what followed
was predicted by economists' "capture theory" of regulation:
sophisticated and powerful financial institutions with
considerable political clout simply captured or co-opted the
regulators." This capture theory is illustrated by certain facts
" See Camp, 401 U.S. at 639.
'4 Id. at 629-34. See also Norton, supra note 12 (arguing that the Camp
decision had long term effects on future judicial interpretations of the Glass-Steagall
Act). In effect, the U.S. Supreme Court's "subtle hazards" analysis opened a pathway
for U.S. courts and the federal banking regulators to apply a range of 'safety net"
factors in considering whether newly proposed activities were permissible under the
Glass-Steagall Act provisions. Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
16 Id. §§ 6801-6803.
"Bundling" refers to the practice of offering product A and product B as a
single product. This practice is prohibited by antitrust law as "tying," unless there are
no feasible less restrictive alternatives. See CHRISTIAN AHLBORN ET AL., JOINT CENTER,
THE ANTITRUST ECONOMICS OF TYING: A FAREWELL TO PER SE ILLEGALITY (Mar. 2004)
3-4, 7, available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=243
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
" See H. D. Vinod & R. R. Geddes, Generalized Estimating Equations for
Panel Data and Managerial Monitoring in Electric Utilities, in ADVANCES ON
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revealed over the years in various forums, including regulatory
proceedings at public utility commissions, congressional
testimony, 9 and academic journals and newspapers. Consider
the following reported examples: (i) known conflicts of interest
within such institutions, with no action taken until Enron
collapsed; (ii) manipulation of the minutes of boards of
directors; (iii) unpaid arbitration awards won by ordinary
investors; and (iv) information paucity in regard to municipal
bonds. These and other abuses are well known to regulators
and well documented in the financial press."
III. TERMINOLOGY
For efficiency's sake, this paper will give some common
words and expressions a more expansive categorical meaning,
as follows:
1) Financial instruments (securities) include various
bank deposits, money market funds, stocks, bonds, shares in
mutual funds, call or put options, derivatives, shares in hedge
funds, and other financial assets.
2) Financial intermediaries (vendors) include the
entities buying and selling securities. Vendors include banks,
securities dealers, brokerage houses, mutual fund companies,
and savings and loan associations.
3) The buyers of securities (investors) include individual
savers ranging from wage-earners to beneficiaries such as
widows and orphans, pension funds, private businesses
(including large and small corporations), charities, and non-
profits (including universities and churches).
4) The sellers of securities (borrowers) consist of all who
want to borrow funds. This includes individuals, businesses,
and many public and private entities such as governments and
entrepreneurs.
5) The market for securities includes stock and bond
markets both physical and electronic. The market brings
METHODOLOGICAL AND APPLIED ASPECTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 597, 597-617
(N. Balakrishnan ed., 2000).
" See Arthur Levitt Jr., Opening Statement, The Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (Jan. 24, 2002), http://www.senate.gov/
-gov-affairs/012402levitt.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (testifying "[E]nron's collapse
did not occur in a vacuum. Its backdrop is an obsessive zeal by too many American
companies to project greater earnings from year to year. When I was at the SEC, I
referred to this as a 'culture of gamesmanship'....").
' See, e.g., Susan Pulliam et al., How Hazards for Investors Get Tolerated
Year After Year, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2004, at Al.
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together the diverse timing and quantity needs of investors and
borrowers (buyers and sellers of securities) and sets the prices
of securities that will clear the market.
6) Securities laws and regulations are enforced by
regulators (regulators) including: the Federal Reserve Bank
(Fed) (sets monetary policy and can influence the prices of
government bonds); the Treasury Department, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (oversees national banks);
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (ensures the
proper working of stock and bond markets); all federal, state,
and local regulatory and licensing bodies that control various
actors in the market including banks, brokerages, analysts,
accountants, auditors, and lawyers; and state attorneys
general" (although not formal regulators, they have been
playing an increasingly important role in securities
regulation)."
7) Security research analysts (analysts) study the
nature of each security and report to the community of
investors. Analysts study the characteristics of individual
securities, balance sheets and other relevant information, and
report on the actual financial condition of borrowers - their
current and future revenues and costs. As securities get more
sophisticated, analysts have to predict the future profits of
borrowers, the ability of investors to share in these profits, and
the risk that investors will be saddled with borrowers' future
debts.
IV. INEFFICIENCIES IN SECURITIES MARKETS
Economic theory, starting with Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations, posits certain ways in which free markets work. Smith
formulated one basis for contemporary economic models with
his famous "invisible hand":
Every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of
the society as great as he can. He generally indeed neither intends to
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
21 New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer has been particularly active in
recent years.
" Justice Louis Brandeis, in a famous 1932 dissent, declared "that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[,l and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). Hence, the reference to states as "laboratories of
democracy."
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cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those
who affected to trade for the public good. '
In the free market for securities, borrowers compete
with each other for investor funds by offering attractive yields,
and investor lenders compete with each other by going after the
most profitable investment opportunities. This theory suggests
that prices (e.g., borrowing costs to builders and investor
yields) will adjust until all market participants agree that the
price is right. The survival and success of the capitalist system
depends on the smooth functioning of a free market for
securities to allocate resources to activities most in demand by
the public. The job of regulators is to make sure that the
market is honest, efficient, and fair.2
Economic theorists believe that free markets are an
efficient way to organize commerce. However, there is no
guarantee that all free markets are efficient in fact. Of all the
markets, the market for securities is often considered the most
efficient, in that it rapidly and completely incorporates all
relevant information into asset prices. It does so because
departure from efficiency creates an imbalance that allows for
profit-making opportunities known as arbitrage. For example,
the price of gold in London and New York does not differ much
because, if a price differential does arise, arbitrageurs are
ready to buy in one market and sell in another. Although
arbitrage may assist in bringing market efficiency to the
securities market, there are illegal activities, conflicts of
interest, and other inefficiencies that are impossible for
arbitrageurs to check. Furthermore, as detailed below, there
are increasing instances in which arbitrage should have
occurred but did not.
'" See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1976). See
also The Library of Economics and Liberty, Biography of Adam Smith, available at
httpJ/www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Smith.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
4 For an excellent survey of economists' ideas regarding fairness and justice,
see James Konow, Which is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice
Theories, XLI (4) J. ECON. LITERATURE 1188, 1188-89 (2003). See also Council of
Securities Regulators of the Americas (COSRA), Principles of Effective Market
Oversight, pmbl. (naming honesty, efficiency, and fairness as its goals), at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/cosra/p-over-e.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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Lamont and Thaler" have identified several instances
where financial markets failed to follow even the very basic law
of one price: that identical goods should have an identical price.
They offer five examples: (i) a closed end country fund for
Germany had a premium of 100% in January 1990; (ii)
American depository receipts (ADRs) for a stock of an Indian
company called Infosys had a premium of 136% over the
Bombay price; (iii) pricing of Royal Dutch compared to Shell,
with an expected ratio of 1.5, was 30% too low in 1981 and 15%
too high in 1996; (iv) two classes of shares based on voting
rights sometimes had wildly different market prices; and (v)
the ratio of Palm and 3Com shares differed from the expected
ratio of 1.5 as investors wanted to pay some 2.5 billion to buy
expensive shares of Palm."6 Economists have offered various
explanations for these inefficiencies, founding their theories on
both the limits of human rationality and the tendency towards
isolated decisionmaking.
While such instances are rare, we must recognize that
the market is a human invention with many imperfections.
Labels (Palm versus 3Com) do matter to us; human self-
interest as well as rationality is, in the words of Nobel Prize
winning economist Herbert A. Simon, "bounded."7 In his book
Models of My Life, Simon points out that most people are only
partly rational, and are in fact emotional/irrational in the
remaining part of their actions.' He argues that boundedly
rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving
complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing,
retrieving, transmitting) information.
Even if some notion of fairness" is implicit in economic
decisionmaking, investors tend to think through their choices
in isolation (choice bracketing), subject to the law of "small
numbers." This term, coined by Kahneman and Tversky,"
signifies the human tendency to rely on small samples and
jump to unreliable, unscientific conclusions. For example, from
a small amount of data, many on Wall Street assume a very
rosy picture about a corporation. The herd instinct among
2 See Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Law of One
Price in Financial Markets, 17(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193 (2003).
26 Id. at 194-98.
27 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE 87-88 (MIT Press 1996) (1991).
Albert Einstein illustrates this point in Simon's argument. See id. at 375-78.
See Konow, supra note 24.
" See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47(2) ECONOMETRICA 263, 263-91 (1979).
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traders then leads to self-fulfilling prophesies of market
volatilities and other imperfections.
Although we admit that some imperfections, such as
those mentioned above, are inevitable, this paper focuses on
some of the avoidable imperfections in the activities of analysts
and vendors. Economic theory suggests that regulation of
securities markets should seek to remove avoidable
imperfections, while ensuring honest and fair treatment of all
parties. We should acknowledge the cost of these regulations,
and encourage regulators to strive to make markets efficient at
a minimum cost to society."
The public policy of promoting greater transparency for
public companies is an important step towards achieving
efficient markets. Moreover, as the Enron example revealed,
such transparency cannot be limited to domestic operations of
public companies, but must extend to all jurisdictions. Some
Caribbean and other tax haven countries including
Switzerland' have banking privacy laws, which do not permit
their banking and other corporations to reveal even basic
information about deposits. These laws are mainly designed for
tax avoidance, and may seem otherwise benign from the
viewpoint of investors. Since the Enron bankruptcy
demonstrated that off-balance sheet special purpose entities
registered in tax haven countries can also be used to mislead
investors, they are clearly not benign. These abuses of tax
havens cannot be permitted in the future.
Although we acknowledge these unavoidable sources of
market inefficiency and note the jurisdictional shortfalls of
current regulations, proposed regulatory solutions fail to
31 For a discussion of market efficiency in the context of downside risk and
how investors can minimize such risk, see HRISHIKESH D. VINOD & DERRICK REAGLE,
PREPARING FOR THE WORST: INCORPORATING DOWNSIDE RISK IN STOCK MARKET
INVESTMENTS (Wiley Publishers 2004) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE WORST].
Downside risk arises from losses to investors who make wrong choices, as reflected by
the prices of their investments going down. Both losses and gains are an integral part
of a well functioning market. An efficient market provides accurate price signals to
investors with as little delay as possible with the current state of knowledge. New tools
for investors, which allow for departures from expected utility theory, are explained in
Chapter (X). These tools were developed using the methods advanced by Lamont and
Thaler, proponents of prospect theory as outlined in part IV supra. PREPARING FOR THE
WORST also includes numerous pages of discussion relevant to conflicts analysis.
32 Holden Lewis, Swiss Bank Accounts: Myth vs. Reality (Feb. 27, 2001), at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/bank/20010227a.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2004)
(noting that "[S]wiss law prohibits the bank not only from revealing your balance, but
from acknowledging that you're a customer or revealing when you made your last
transaction. Bankers can go to jail for violating Swiss privacy laws.").
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address our primary concern with conflicts of interest within
financial institutions. The next Part of this paper seeks
insights from economic theory regarding conflicts of interest,
and explores recent evidence on market inefficiencies.
V. THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND RECENT EVIDENCE
George J. Stigler 3' appears to be the first economist to
study conflicts of interest. According to Stigler, "[c]onflicts of
interest arise whenever one man is an agent for another; [and]
the agent does not bear the full consequences of his actions."'
In his view, the question is quantitative, and does not permit a
"nice" answer. Since 1967, economists, using game theory to
sharpen their ideas of the so-called principal-agent problem,
have contended that conflicts arise primarily from the fact that
the agent has more information than the principal. For our
purposes, we will confine conflicts of interest to those arising
when the agent's financial interests interfere, or appear to
interfere, with his obligation to act in the best interest of the
principal (or his client). We will not address those conflicts that
arise out of improper bias, and we will further limit the
application of conflicts of interest to various players in financial
markets.
A new way to think about the conflict in our context is
as a game played between divisions of vendors. In this two-
person game, Investor Lender Services (ILS) division includes
all activities serving investors or lenders, and Investment
Banking and Borrower Services (IBBS) division includes all
activities serving sellers of securities or borrowers. If, then, the
account manager for a large investor guides the investment
dollars to the vendor's investment banking clients, the payoff is
10 for the account manager and 8 for the investment banker
(see Table 1, top left figure). Although the numbers chosen are
hypothetical, the tabulated payoffs are calculated according to
the conventions of game theory.' Since the vendor owns and
controls both divisions, the overall payoff to the vendor is the
sum total of the payoffs from each division.
See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Conflict of Interest, 75 J. POL.
ECON. 100, 100-01 (1967).
'4 Id. at 101.
'5 Id. at 100.
36 In Table 1, the two payoff numbers separated by a comma refer to the
row's payoff and the column's payoff, respectively.
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This game resembles the well known "prisoner's
dilemma," with an additional twist that encourages the
prisoners to cooperate. If, by analogy to the vendors' situation,
both prisoners were employed by a drug cartel, there would be
no dilemma. In either situation, the cooperative solution is
socially optimal. Moreover, as essentially the same game will
be played repeatedly during the entire time the employees
work for the employer, subtle kickback schemes will not be
hard to invent. It is highly likely, therefore, that the
cooperative equilibrium solution (10, 8) will prevail, despite
any Chinese Wall or rules by regulators.
Although the overall payoff to society is not
quantifiable, it is qualitatively highest when there is no conflict
of interest and both divisions are objective in making
recommendations to their respective clients. Returning to
Table 1, the hypothetical numbers in parentheses measure
society's payoff. This number will be in the negative when the
externality from conflicts of interest hurts society through
misallocation of resources, and lower returns to investors and
higher costs to borrower businesses create irrational
exuberance or pessimism. The preponderance of buy orders
leads to overbuilding and waste.37
Table 1: Hypothetical payoffs for two divisions
Division IBBS favors Division IBBS remains
vendor's clients objective
Division ILS favors 10*, 8, (-7)** 10, 4, (-3)
vendor's securities
Division ILS remains 7,8,(-4) 7,4,(0)
objective I
The numbers in italics represent the payoff to the row (lenders).
** The numbers in parentheses are the payoff to society, i.e. the advantage from
efficient allocation of resources minus the externality arising from a better deal to
the ordinary investor and to the honest business borrower.
The payoff to the vendor is the highest in the top left
figure, whereas society is best off with zero (bottom right
figure). The incentives of the owners of the two divisions will
ultimately force the game to be resolved according to the top
' For example, conflicts of interest not only failed to stop the fraud at
WorldCom, they encouraged overcapacity in telecommunications, and gave several
incorrect market signals leading to huge losses. See Editorial, Flawed Financial Giant,
Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 2002, at 156.
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left calculation. It is theoretically possible to "adjust" the game
for "fairness" to the respective clients by adjusting the payoffs.'
Various rules and regulations imposed on the players may be
viewed as such adjustments. This paper argues, however, that
enforcing the adjusted payoffs can be costly, and may create
other distortions, if the players bend over backwards to appear
to be objective and shun meritorious securities simply because
they are vendor-sponsored. The incentives are too over-
whelming for mere regulation to work in this game.
The game allows us to illustrate the notion of excess
rents by subtracting the bottom right numbers (7, 4) from the
top left numbers (10, 8), to yield (3, 4). This yield equals the
hypothetical excess rents earned by vendors using biased
analysts to mislead investors away from the efficient solution
(7, 4). The use of game theory to demonstrate the inefficiencies
created by such conflicts strengthens the argument against
funding biased research.
The agency model is concerned with inefficiency caused
by asymmetric information between the principal (employer)
and agent (employee). Fisch and Sale" use a comprehensive
quasi-agency model to understand the work of analysts, who
have obligations towards: (i) their own employer; (ii) the
investing public; and (iii) the corporation as principal when the
analyst possesses market-sensitive corporate information. It
should be noted that our divestiture proposal will likely result
in the analyst either working for the ILS division, or as a
freelancer serving the interests of investors only, thereby
avoiding the obligations described in the third prong of the
Fisch and Sale model. Standard prohibitions against
inappropriate release of corporate information are all that will
be needed to solve the problems arising from the analysts'
obligations to corporate employers.
Having discussed a few old and new insights offered by
economic theory, let us now turn to recent evidence of market
inefficiencies. As a general matter, market efficiency demands
that investors sell shares in money-losing companies from time
to time, and redirect their investments toward better outlets.
Clients should be encouraged to sell as well as buy securities.
In practice, however, this is rarely the case. In 1998, less than
' See Colin Camerer & R. H. Thaler, In Honor of Matthew Rabin: Winner of
the John Bates Clark Medal, 17(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159-64 (2003).
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1039-40.
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2% of analysts recommended selling a security.0 This paucity of
sell recommendations continued during recent meltdowns of
some stock prices." The analyst has no incentive to make sell
recommendations, since they tend to annoy the managers of
(downgraded) companies, and can dry up investment banking
business for the vendor employing the analyst. The $1.4 billion
settlement with ten Wall Street firms mentioned earlier will
force firm analysts to generate a greater number of sell
recommendations. That being said, any across the board
requirement for all firms to issue sell recommendations would
amount to needless micromanaging.
Direct evidence of market inefficiencies can be found
through an examination of the median growth rate of earnings
for publicly traded companies. In their study, Chan and his
coauthors discovered that the median growth rate of publicly
traded companies between 1951 and 1988 was only about 6%
per year." Those few companies that did consistently exceed
the modest 6% benchmark over a period of five years were
rarely the ones predicted by research analysts.4 The findings of
Chan and his colleagues demonstrate that very high P/ E ratios
for some "hot" stocks often seen in stock markets are very
rarely justified.
Further evidence of market inefficiencies can be found
in Wall Street "consensus forecasts" of earnings by research
analysts in 2004.' For example, more than 100 companies are
expected to grow at a whopping annual rate of over 40% for the
next five years." Past data shows that this tremendous growth
rate has never been achieved, and relying completely on
consensus forecasts will inevitably lead to disappointing
o Jeffrey M. Laderman, Who Can You Trust? Wall Street's Spin Game, Bus.
WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148 (stating, in 1998, that "today, a mere 1.4% of all analyst
recommendations on some 6,000 companies are sells, vs. 67.5% buys and 31.1% holds,
according to Zacks Investment Research. It hasn't always been this way.")
4' Barton G. Malkiel, Remaking The Market: The Great Wall Street?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A16.
42 See Louis KC. Chan et al., The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates, 58
J. FIN. 643, 681 (2003).
Id. at 683.
See, e.g., Reuters, Stock Research and Reports, at http://www.investor.
reuters.com/ResearchEntry.aspx?target=%2fresearch (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
See id. (referring to weekly earnings estimates of S&P companies from late
January 2004). See also Harrison Hong et al., Security Analysts' Career Concerns and
Herding of Earnings Forecasts, 31 RAND J. ECON. 121, 121-24 (2000) (confirming
theories suggesting the presence of herd behavior in these forecasts), available at
httpJ/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=142895#paperdownload (last visited Oct.
24, 2004).
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losses.46 Our game theory analysis suggests that the herd
behavior of analysts in forecasting toward the cooperative
equilibrium is similar to a stampede of 7000 cows (the current
number of brokers regulated by the SEC), which cannot be
stopped by regulatory lions.
Both economic theory and direct evidence shows that
the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) remains
inefficient and prone to abuses, hurting the creation of new
enterprises. Unfortunately, regulators cannot hope to prevent
all such abuses, since there is a great deal of judgment involved
in forecasting the future profitability of any IPO that cannot be
codified. The example provided by using a game theory model
to assess excess rents, as well as the analysis of different
economic models and individual approaches employed by
economists in analyzing disparate economic returns, creates a
comprehensive view of the inefficiencies caused by conflicts in
the securities market. The next Part will discuss additional
issues that tend to compound the problems raised by such
conflicts, and why many of the proposed solutions currently
under consideration have failed.
VI. PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENCIES DESPITE ATTEMPTED
SOLUTIONS
Notwithstanding the newer insights from economic
theory discussed in the preceding Part, the GSA of 1933 and
the GLBA of 1999"7 indicate that the presence of market
inefficiencies has long been recognized. This Part attempts to
explain why the regulatory and legislative solutions offered
thus far have not worked. Sections A and B offer two examples
of how conflicts of interest create incentives that can lead to
inequitable, and often unethical, manipulation of both the
general public and individual analysts. Section C discusses
rules promulgated by various industry associations. While
some industry associations have proposed more exacting rules
to counter these corollary concerns, as well as to address the
primary conflicts that create them, this type of solution can
create additional opportunities for conflict. Strict enforcement
of some of the proposed rules leads to micromanagement of
" See Mark Hulbert, Strategies: That Five-Year Forecast Looks Great, or Does
It?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 6.
" See supra Part II.
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entities that are more efficiently controlled by structural
reorganization and realignment of underlying incentives.
A. Political Favoritism
Excess rents create a huge special interest in the
political arena in favor of vendors who use their economic and
political muscle to force analysts to provide favorable opinions.
Vendors then sugarcoat conflicts of interest as synergies for the
benefit of customers. These vendors argue that excess rents
leading to a profitable banking sector permit lower fees for
customers and are crucial to economic growth. Economists
routinely reject such arguments.
The situation is reminiscent of the statement of Charles
Erwin Wilson, former Chairman of General Motors, at the U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in 1952: "What is
good for the country is good for General Motors, and vice
versa."" According to a recent book by Joseph Stiglitz, while
Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin was in office,
"[tihe new mantra was what is good for Goldman Sachs, or
Wall Street, is good for America and the world. 4 9 Aftei all,
Rubin used to work for Goldman Sachs, but apparently failed
to foresee the conflicts of interest that would arise when he
accepted the Treasury appointment.
Excess rents created in part through political influence
have increasingly led to misallocation of capital. The political
muscle of high rent vendors has hurt market efficiency since
the 1980s, and ultimately led to the weakening and subsequent
repeal of the GSA. Again, economists unequivocally reject such
rents in any economic activity. In light of recent scandals, one
would have expected a moratorium on mergers and
acquisitions involving investment bankers. Not so. The $58
billion June 15, 2004 merger of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
(focused on investment banking) and Bank One Corp. (focused
on retail banking) shows that inattention to conflicts of interest
permits high rents in banking and brokerage businesses. In
other words, the smart money financing this merger is betting
that the merged giant will never have to break up, as the
" See Nominations: Hearings on Nominee Designates Before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 83' Cong. 1040-2 (1953) (statement of Charles E.
Wilson, Nominee Designate for Secretary of Defense).
41 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 275 (2003).
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political leverage of the two merged entities will prevent such
an occurrence. Thus, in this instance and in similar mergers,
the persistence of inefficiencies can be blamed, at least in part,
on the political muscle of large brokerages and money center
banks.
B. Penalties Imposed for Unwelcome Analyst Opinions
While the market fails if some borrowers have a
monopoly on investor funds, the market also fails if analysts do
not have the basic freedom to express their opinions. In prior
discussions, I have cited several instances where vendors,
including BNP Paribus, UBS Paine Webber, and Merrill Lynch,
intimidated and fired analysts for writing unfavorable research
reports about major clients of their investment banking
divisions.' In addition to corrupting the market, the subsidy
from investment banking to research departments is exploited
by rogue CEOs to co-opt vendors and hide their misdeeds. The
SEC and Eliot Spitzer have proven that vendors collect fees
from mutual fund companies in exchange for touting those
same funds to retail clients."
In a competitive environment, reports by research
analysts would be judged on the basis of the analyst's skills at
carefully studying balance sheets and uncovering any hidden
secrets materially affecting the securities. Analysts are
expected to be objective, truthful, and honest in their
representations of available information. However, in a
conflicted market, they can be punished for performing in
accordance with these expectations. A French court recently
imposed a $38 million fine on Morgan Stanley, simply because
analyst Claire Kent noted that the LVMH management, a
corporate manager, had "destroyed value.""2 Such litigation,
forcing analysts to not openly criticize corporate managers, is
chilling and hurts market efficiency, apart from infringing on
the individual analyst's freedom of speech. This is another
reason why current solutions to market inefficiency, which
focus on regulating the individual analyst, have not worked.
See Divest Investment Banking, supra note 1, at 3.
Lynn O'Shaughnessy, A 401(k) Picks a Mutual Fund. Who Gets a Perk?,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2004, § 3, at 5.
" Floyd Norris, Using Courts to Silence Analysts Who Criticize Rather than
Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at C1.
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C. Micromanagement by Committee or with Association
Rules
In Part III, we included state attorneys general among
those regulators who influence rules of behavior. The 2002
settlement with Merrill Lynch reached by the New York
Attorney General provides an excellent example of unworkable
micromanagement, if such an approach were to be used on a
system-wide basis. It asks Merrill Lynch to create a committee
to monitor bankers' and analysts' electronic communications, to
ensure vague goals of "objectivity, integrity, and a rigorous
analytical framework."" This settlement seemingly operates as
an invitation to future rogue vendors to skirt conflicts of
interest rules by preemptively creating a "committee" with
vague, yet lofty-sounding, mandates. If the rogue vendor is
caught, the committee can be blamed and some of its members
fired. In practice, there is nothing to prevent the committee
from focusing most of its energy on avoiding culpable e-mails
and not getting caught, so as to benefit from large potential
profits.
In May 2002, after massive media exposure of recent
abuses, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
a self-regulatory body, adopted some tough talk"' and the
" A summary of the Merrill Lynch settlement agreement was issued by
White & Case, LLP. See Memorandum from the Worldwide Securities Practice Group,
New Research Analyst Conflict of Interest Rules, (May 24, 2002), at
http://www.whitecase.com/memoconflict-of interest.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
White & Case explained the principal actions required by the agreement as follows:
On May 21, 2002, the Attorney General of the State of New York reached an
agreement with Merrill Lynch settling its investigation into Merrill Lynch's
research practices. Under the settlement, Merrill Lynch is required to take
certain specific actions to reform its research practices. The actions mandated
under the settlement are consistent with the changes to the NASD's and
NYSE's conflict of interest rules....
Merrill Lynch must create a Research Recommendations Committee (the
'RRC') to monitor the performance of and supervise recommendations for
objectivity, integrity, and a rigorous analytical framework in the development
of all recommendations. Merrill Lynch must also create a system to monitor
investment bankers' and analysts' electronic communications.
Id.
" See NASD Notice to Members, SEC Approves Rule Governing Research
Analysts' Conflicts of Interest, at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/0239ntm.txt (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004). The NASD stated as follows:
Rule 2711 is intended to restore investor confidence in a process that is
critical to the equities markets. The rule reflects a self-policing approach
consistent with strong self-regulation. Members and research analysts must
take all measures that are necessary to ensure that all research reports
reflect an analyst's honest views and that any opinion or recommendation is
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following rules:5 (i) a prohibition on offering favorable research
to induce investment banking business; (ii) structural reforms
to increase analyst independence, including a prohibition on
investment banking personnel supervising analysts or
approving research reports; (iii) a prohibition on tying analyst
compensation to a specific investment banking services
transaction; (iv) increased disclosures of conflicts of interest in
research reports and public appearances by analysts; (v)
restrictions on personal trading by analysts; and (vi) disclosure
in research reports of data and price charts showing the firms'
ratings track record.
The NASD rules are admittedly important, but I
suggest that we should minimize the need for their active
enforcement. Note that these six rules do not explicitly prohibit
investment bankers from influencing the hiring of security
analysts. In August 1999, Dennis Kozlowski, the CEO of Tyco,
asked Merrill to hire Phua K. Young, a pro-Tyco research
analyst at Lehman Brothers, apparently in exchange for
Merrill receiving a lead role in Tyco's $2.1 billion bond
offering.' E-mails reveal that the Merrill-Tyco deal was
arranged by Samuel Chapin, Merrill's "relationship manager"
for Tyco." It is likely that following Tyco, a vendor's procurer or
"relationship manager" will still aim to please clients by
promising favorable "equity research coverage," yet he or she
not influenced by conflicts of interest. If a member issues a report or a
research analyst renders an opinion that is inconsistent with the analyst's
actual views regarding a subject company, NASD considers such action to
constitute a fraudulent act and conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade.
Id. (emphasis added).
' See NASD, Rules of the Association, §§ 2711 (b), (e), (g), (h)(2), (j), at
httpJl/cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=4&FileName=/nasd/nasd-
rules/RulesoftheAssociation.mg.xml#chp-1_4j190 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also
SEC, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking (July 29, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
48252.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); Memorandum, supra note 53 (giving details
involving: (i) relationships and communications, (ii) compensation of analysts, (iii)
compensation of securities firms, (iv) promises of favorable research, (v) quiet periods,
(vi) disclosure of financial interest in recommended companies, (vii) restriction on
personal trading by analysts, (viii) disclosures during analyst's public appearances, (ix)
disclosure regarding firm's ratings in research reports, and (x) prominence of
disclosures).
See Edgar Snyder & Assocs., NASD Charges Phua K Young, Former
Merrill Lynch Analyst Covering Tyco International (May 2003), at
http://www.edgarsnyder.comlsecurities fraud/young-phua.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2004) (reporting that Merrill's Phua Young was charged with misleading investors).
See also Bloomberg News, Big Investor in Tyco Gives Testimony at Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2004, at C6.
7 Christopher Bowe & Gary Silverman, Merrill Rewarded After Hiring
Analyst Tyco Favoured, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at 1.
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will not retain e-mail records. To prevent this, we ultimately
need separation of ownership, competitive markets, and other
devices to correctly align incentives so that these rules are not
only obeyed, but also rendered (mostly) unnecessary.
Additionally, it appears that small-scale securities
dealers have been very slow in obeying the NASD rules. For
example, Justin Hughes, a former research analyst at Jefferies
Group, received the following phone message in the Summer of
2002: "If you truly believe that your compensation has nothing
to do with [investment] banking revenue, then you are way out
of whack .... You get paid based on banking revenue."' This
message reveals that in cases involving conflicts of interest,
micromanaging with rules is ineffective and unenforceable.
In May 2004, the Bond Market Association (BMA)
issued "guiding principles" similar to the NASD rules. The
principles include: (i) required disclosure of payments received;
(ii) a ban on promises of favorable research to investment
banking clients; (iii) a ban on retaliation against analysts who
publish negative research; (iv) a prohibition on trading by
trading desks ahead of research reports; and (v) a prohibition
on investment bankers' opportunity to review, pressure, or
control researchers." As with the NASD rules, the incentive to
break such rules, necessary as they may be, will persist. In
sum, association rules are not sufficiently effective in curbing
market inefficiencies, as they can themselves create further
conflicts, and their enforcement requires costly micro-
management.
The last two Parts of this paper have demonstrated that
market inefficiencies are both serious and persistent. Current
solutions now on the table are at best inadequate for the task
at hand, and at worst counterproductive. The next Part
proposes that we should break up the IBBS and ILS divisions
of any future offending vendor. We should not ignore the power
of the threat of "break-up" as a low-cost enforcer of conflict of
Susanne Craig, Research Rules Trickle Down to Small Firms, WALL ST. J.,
Jan.19, 2004, at C1.
' See The Bond Market Association, Guiding Principles to Promote the
Integrity of Fixed Income Research (May 19, 2004), http://www.bondmarkets.com/
assets/files/GuidingPrinciples for Research.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also
Press Release, Bond Market Association, The Bond Market Association Issues Final
Guiding Principles to Promote Integrity of Fixed Income Research; Principles Apply
Globally After Extensive International Review (May 19, 2004), http://bondmarkets.com/
story. asp?id= 1096 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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interest rules, one far superior to the micromanagement
currently used by industry associations and other regulators.
VII. DIVESTITURE OF VENDORS CAN SOLVE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
This part discusses divestiture of offending vendors into
two divisions: (a) investor lender services (ILS) and (b)
investment banking and borrower services (IBBS). Although
the threat of divestiture is not currently considered as a
remedy for egregious behavior by vendors, I contend that this
threat will serve as a low-cost enforcer of conflict of interest
rules.'
Where does the remedy of divestiture come from? The
disadvantages to the fair and effective operation of the
securities market created by both general inefficiencies and the
more specific conflicts of interest, including the detrimental
corollary effects of such conflicts, are similar to concerns raised
in antitrust law, and it is from that area that we take our
proposed solution."' Antitrust laws are designed to save
capitalism from the anticompetitive behavior and excess rents
enjoyed by large monopolies. The key remedies against
monopolistic abuses in antitrust law are divestiture, the threat
of divestiture, 6  and treble damages awarded to private
litigants.' The antitrust remedy of treble damages might be
useful in our context, as a large fine imposed for violations of
securities laws (e.g., $100 million for Merrill Lynch), might
simply be viewed by Merrill as the cost of doing business,
written off against large excess rents earned by skirting
conflict of interest rules. In the antitrust context, treble
damages are an essential component of an effective deterrent
program, as the public benefit of imposing such damages
outweighs the potentially negative consequence of reducing
entrepreneurial risk-taking. In the private sector, however, the
opposite is true. The reduced entrepreneurial risk-taking
resulting from the threat of costly private litigation by victims
of conflict of interest abuses is unacceptable.2 Instead, vendors
For further discussion, see Divest Investment Banking, supra note 1, at 1.
61 See AREEDA, supra note 7, at 155-56, 158(c), 223-26.
62 See id.
See id.
See David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral?
Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 870,
878-80, 885-87 (1990) (referring to literature arguing that private antitrust
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shown to be practicing anticompetitive behavior and collecting
excess rents should be limited with the threat of divestiture.'
A. Benefits from Divesting Conflicted Entities
Divestiture will benefit specific stakeholders in financial
markets for the following reasons:
(i) The ILS, IBBS separation will create direct and
exclusive accountability within each division, as the division
serving the borrowers will only be judged on how well it does
that job, irrespective of how it impacts other divisions owned by
the same conglomerate. Its profitability will solely depend on
how well it performs in the interest of its clients. For example,
if the ILS division tries to skirt the interest of lenders and
curries favor with the investment banking clients of an
affiliated division, the lenders themselves will punish it for
failing to obtain the highest possible yield. This will function as
a natural incentive against biased research. Similarly, if the
investment banking division favors particular lenders by giving
them favorable treatment resulting in higher yields, borrowers
themselves will punish it for not lowering their borrowing cost.
(ii) The stockholders of vendors will likely see the value
of their shares increase. There are many examples, such as the
creation of Baby Bells, where the sum value of parts exceeds
the value of the whole.' The ILS and IBBS divisions, serving
lenders and borrowers, respectively, will receive appropriate
stock market price signals. For example, when Citibank (the
vendor) served Parmalat (the borrower) in a complex 1999 deal,
the IBBS division earned some fees, but the ILS division lost
its reputation and more, since Citibank was exposed as a $689
million lender to Parmalat."7 This example shows that the value
enforcement is "neutral" in its effect on deterrence, and arguing that probability of
conviction has to be high enough for the deterrence to kick in). Accordingly, the fine
has to be large and fairly certain to have significant deterrent effect.
Upon divestiture, the current shareholders of vendors will receive an
appropriate number of shares in each division. The market will quote separate prices
for the two divisions, whose fortunes will no longer be linked. Since there will only be
two divisions, this approach would be easier than the 1984 creation of seven local Bell
telephone companies along with AT&T. See Production Studies, supra note 1, at 2.
See id. at 1-4.
67 See Mitchell Pacelle & Jo Wrighton, Citigroup Wipes up Spilled Milk,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2004, at Cl. Citigroup said it took a $242 million charge for credit
and trading losses connected to the collapse of Parmalat SpA. Citigroup said the charge
to fourth quarter earnings stemmed from $689 million of total exposure to Parmalat.
Citigroup said its $689 million pretax exposure to Parmalat consisted of about $400
million of credit secured by third-party receivables, another $255 million of unsecured
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shareholders attribute to a vendor may be directly lost due to a
conflicted combination of two divisions within one vendor, and
indirectly lost due to a damaged reputation. Indeed, in banking
and investor services, reputation is often the most important
component of shareholder value.
Of course, the reduction in excess rents will make
vendors less profitable. As a result, they will have to generate
greater efficiencies to retain profit margins, rendering them
more competitive in the global marketplace.
(iii) Employees of financial institutions will benefit,
since their missions will be more clearly defined as
representing the borrower or lender, and they will no longer be
subject to impractical and unenforceable regulations regarding
who they can talk to and how they are compensated. In the
past, vendors made many researchers scapegoats for doing
conflicted jobs. In a divested firm, scapegoats would not be
necessary. For example, had Merrill employee Phua Young
been exclusively representing Merrill's ILS division for lenders,
he might have been suspicious when Tyco's CEO paid for a
background check on Mr. Young's fiancee.' Similarly, had Mr.
Young been exclusively representing Merrill's IBBS division to
boost borrowers like Tyco, his research reports would have had
little credibility, since Merrill was underwriting $2.1 billion of
Tyco bonds under false pretenses. 9 Whatever favors Tyco did
for Mr. Young would have no effect on anyone from the ILS
division; there would be no penalty on the IBBS division and
there would be no need for a scapegoat.
(iv) Stockholders of borrower corporations will receive
efficient investment banking services and proper investment
advice regarding the viability of their expansion plans. The
advice might be explicit, from experts who are interested in
long term rewards, not merely focused on deal commissions.
The stockholder benefits might be indirect, implicitly reflected
credit and about $36 million of trading exposure. Id. See also Henny Sender, Citigroup
Is Sued over Notes Linked to Enron's Credit Status, WALL ST. J., August 26, 2004, at
C4. The Bank of New York Co. has filed suit against Citigroup over the sale of financial
instruments linked to Enron Corp. The suit could involve as much as $2.5 billion in
liability for Citigroup. Id.
See Laura Italiano, Tyco Honcho's 20G Gift "Eye" N.Y. POST, Jan. 21, 2004,
at 26; Brad McGee, Ex-Tyco Official Says Company Paid for Private Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at C2.
69 Jeanne King, Tyco Trial Focuses on Merrill Analyst, REUTERS, Feb. 2,
2004, available at http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/news.htm?story-id=7513&
topic=Tyco%20%2OStock%20Fraud (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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in the borrowing costs charged by the lenders in an efficient
market free of conflicts.
(v) The management of borrower corporations, without
the ability to arm-twist the lender, will benefit from focused
investment banking (borrowing) advice without conflicts. All
projects will be judged on their merits, otherwise the IBBS
division will not earn its keep.
(vi) The management of vendor corporations will benefit
from a more focused mission that does not carry the danger of
criminal prosecution for conflicts of interest. In addition, the
ILS and IBBS divisions will create twice the number of top
management positions through divestiture.
(vii) Investors and the general public will benefit from
superior allocation of savings to higher yielding activities,
leading in turn to increased living standards, greater trade,
and more profitable investments. The general public will also
benefit from reduced costs of regulation of financial
institutions. Finally, if Adam Smith is right, there will be
greater due diligence by those in charge of other people's
money due to the "invisible hand" of competitive market forces.
Although it has desirable aspects, I am not suggesting
across the board divestiture of all vendors. I would hope that
vendors will voluntarily create ILS and IBBS divisions as a
preventative measure and, in the alternative, I propose a step-
by-step approach to avoid unintended consequences. The threat
of breakup will enable regulators to check if: (i) analyst
forecasts are generally accurate or are too rosy; (ii) there are
enough sell recommendations; and (iii) investment banking
clients are rewarded with favorable research. If violations are
discovered, the vendors should be divested into two divisions.
Divestiture of violators will be cleaner, simpler, cheaper,
and more effective. It will give teeth to procedures for
monitoring violations of the Chinese Wall or other self-
regulations. Divestiture will remove a basic conflict of interest
embedded in the structure and the business model of violator
firms pretending to serve both buy and sell sides of securities
markets, and remove a harmful synergy that encourages what
Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the SEC, called "a
culture of gamesmanship."7 If the breakup of violators is swift,
70 See Levitt, supra note 19, discussing this as a culture where:
[I]t's okay to bend the rules, tweak the numbers, and let obvious and
important discrepancies slide .... [Clompanies bend to the desires and
pressures of Wall Street analysts rather than to the reality of numbers ....
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it will let the regulators focus on their original jobs by
enforcing honest and full disclosure, while simultaneously
preventing fraud, and exposing and punishing the perpetrators
of fraud. The divestiture will eliminate the need to
micromanage the internal operations of offending vendors,
such as reading millions of e-mails, tracking weekend contacts,
examining all hiring, salary and promotion decisions, and
prevent stealth compensations and sweetheart deals to
analysts supporting investment banking clients.
Divestiture removes the incentive for ILS divisions to
promote a particular investment over another, except to find
the best yield given the risk tolerance and asset size of the
client. Schwab does not have an IBBS division, and it is able to
prosper.7' After divestiture, the ILS division of a violator can
similarly survive and prosper, without regulation of internal
personnel practices. Under the threat of divestiture, a future
Henry Blodgett will have to admit that he represents the
investment bankers, and his rosy forecasts of
telecommunications companies will be treated like
advertisements. During the recent bubble years, such
disclosures might have saved telecommunications billions in
excess capacity building, fueled by Mr. Blodgett's commercials
paraded by Merrill and other vendors as independent research.
B. Arguments against Divestiture and Proposed Solutions
Having outlined the benefits of divestiture or the threat
of divestiture, it is important to consider, and take the
opportunity to answer, some arguments against divesting
firms. The first argument is best demonstrated through the
Bell Labs example. The 1984 breakup and divesture of Bell
Systems confirmed a very short-term outlook for many
[A]nalysts more often overlook dubious accounting practices and too often are
selling potential investment banking deals .... [Aluditors are more occupied
with selling other services and making clients happy than detecting potential
problems . . . and . . . directors are more concerned about not offending
management than with protecting shareholders.
Id. Note that ex post awards of reimbursements and prizes to research outfits will
create incentives to expose companies and leaders who are followers of gamesmanship.
Good research will produce correct earnings estimates after subtracting the costs of
management spin and shenanigans and provide a valuable service to the investing
public.
71 See THE CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION, CORPORATE OVERVIEW 20-27
(Mar. 2004), available at http://ir.thomsonfn.con/InvestorRelations/IRFiles/5184/
presentationsCorpOverview0304.ppt (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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American corporations."2 Bell Labs' (now Lucent) share price
plummeted from nearly $90 in 2000 to under $1 in some
periods of 2002.7' Of necessity, therefore, Lucent nearly gutted
its research budget for fundamental innovations.7 ' From 1925
to the breakup in 1984, Bell Labs was a premier U.S.
institution, conducting fundamental research in physics,
chemistry, and telecommunications engineering. It invented
the transistor, color TV, cell phones, and thousands of useful
products. The reduced funding for Bell Labs research caused by
the divestiture hurt the company's capacity for such
innovation.
In our particular context, the argument against
divesture is that research analysts perform the vital functions
of information evaluation and dissemination, and that this
work is not viable without a subsidy from the investment
banking division. Let us review the research landscape to see if
the argument can justify the high rents earned to the
detriment of the investing public.
The first players on the landscape are news
organizations such as Dow Jones, Bloomberg, Reuters, etc.,
who devote resources to business news in the public interest,
yet are primarily interested in selling news to the public and
special reports to investors. Their focus is on news-worthiness,
and is sometimes motivated by a desire to scoop competing
news organizations rather than to provide quality research for
the benefit of the investor. The second set of players are rating
agencies such as S&P and Moody's, who sell their detailed
research while providing broad ratings to the general public."
Both had encouraged investment in Enron by calling Enron's
debt "investment grade" in the weeks close to its bankruptcy."
72 See Michelle Kessler, Many Companies Cut Research Budgets, USA TODAY,
Feb. 23, 2003 (stating that research budgets are being cut by 9% in major U.S.
corporations), available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2003-
02-23-researchx.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
' Ticker symbol for Lucent LU can be used to find historical prices, splits,
etc. See CNN/Money, Lucent Falls to $1 (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://money.cnn.com/
2002/0917/technologyllucent (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
"' Kessler, supra note 72 (pointing out that Lucent had trimmed research
spending by one billion dollars since 2001).
' See Standard & Poor's, What is Standard & Poor's?, at http://www2.
standardandpoors.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=sp/PageAboutUsMainPg
&r=1&l-EN&b=8 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); Moody's, Moody's Role in the Global
Capital Markets, at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/custJstaticcontent/2000200000
265777.asp?section=about&topic=intro (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
76 See Kreag Danvers & B. Anthony Billings, Is the SEC Going Soft on Credit
Rating Agencies?, CPA J., http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj/2004/504/print
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The third set consists of vendors who, with their own research
departments, provide specific (strong buy, buy, hold, and sell)
recommendations to their clients. The fourth set includes some
Internet sites (earnings.nasdaq.com) providing similar services
regarding the "consensus earnings" forecasts made by
professional analysts to the general public.77
In considering the impact of divestiture on a vendor
convicted of conflict of interest abuses, I find it likely that
research budgets will be cut. However, this may not be all bad.
Returning to the players on our landscape, it is fair to say that
there is no well-respected premier American institution
researching the market for securities for the public good.
Furthermore, the current research subsidized by investment
banking revenues is mostly proprietary, not public. Finally,
according to our game theory, the research conducted by the
convicted vendor would have been biased. These examples of
biased and faulty research informing the securities market did
not produce a public good comparable to the invention of the
transistor at Bell Labs. In fact, it was biased research that led
to the huge losses at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat, and
others."8
While the research budget will likely be reduced, some
research funds can be raised through a pro-rata assessment on
borrowers, i.e., all corporations who issue securities or bonds,
consistent with the accepted economic principle that the seller
pays for marketing. However, since such an assessment is not a
cost to market particular securities to investors, it is best
viewed as a tax. Choi and Fisch have suggested a novel way of
disbursing these hypothetical taxes by using a voucher
version6.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also Mark Gilbert, Credit Rating
Regulation Is Coming, Ready or Not, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 12, 2004), at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email-us&refer=columnist-gilbert&sid=aK
qblwztCcPg (last visited Oct. 26, 2004), commenting:
Parmalat was rated BBB - by S&P, the lowest level on the investment-grade
scale, until Dec. 9, two weeks before the dairy company filed for Italy's
biggest bankruptcy. In November 2001, Moody's was poised to cut Enron's
rating by two levels, dropping what was then the world's biggest energy
trader out of investment grade. After lobbying by the company's bankers, the
rating fell just one level to Baa3. The following month, Enron filed for
bankruptcy protection owing $67 billion.
Id.
17 See Hong et al., supra note 45 (finding herd behavior as a result of such
forecasts).
78 See Hrishikesh D. Vinod, Winners and Losers in Multiple Failures at
Enron and Some Policy Changes (Apr. 9, 2002) (discussing winners and losers in the
Enron saga), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300542 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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system."9 Then again, if a tax is paying for securities research,
why keep it with investment bankers? Why not temporarily
subsidize independent analysts who produce high quality
research reports that stand the test of time? As long as
subsidized sales of conflicted research by investment bankers is
paraded as independent research, the market for truly
independent research lacks a level playing field. To clarify my
position, let us again return to the securities research
landscape, and divide it into two components: past data and
future prospects. The funding methods for the two components
need not be identical; in fact, I propose two distinct low-cost
funding methods for the two kinds of research.
1. Past Data Research
There are several regulators who require public
corporations to follow numerous accounting rules and file facts
relating to balance sheet items including assets, liabilities,
revenues, costs, payments, salaries and benefits paid to top
executives, etc.' Past data research evaluates all such
information, plus all relevant stock and bond market prices.
The data is often presented in the form of a few dozen
indicators familiar to Wall Street traders, including price
earnings ratio (P/E), earnings per share (EPS), and cash flow
analysis. Considerable information is already available on
public sites such as Yahoo." Under my proposal, it will be the
responsibility of regulators to make past data research
promptly, reliably, and publicly available on the Internet at
minimal cost, if any. Regulators can easily require each
borrower to file a form on the Internet, certifying the accuracy
of the few dozen commonly used indicators.82 In the process of
certifying the basic facts such as earnings and assets, this
requirement may uncover, and even prevent, some fraud.
" See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE. L. J. 269, 276-77 (2003).
'o See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and
Maintains Market Integrity (observing that although the SEC is the primary regulator,
other regulators include "Congress, other federal departments and agencies, the self-
regulatory organizations (e.g. the stock exchanges), state securities regulators, and
various private organizations."), at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
"' See e.g., Yahoo! Finance Homepage, at http://finance.yahoo.com (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004). If you know the ticker symbol, you can access considerable
information about the security represented by that symbol at this and similar sites.
' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act already has such requirements aimed at
preventing future Enrons. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a) (2004).
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Research involving an analysis of past and current data,
however, should go beyond publishing pro-forma earnings and
reported cash flows. David Bianco of UBS, with an apparently
small team of accountants, has analyzed S&P 500 companies
for quality of earnings, and has provided adjusted pro-forma
earnings for so-called one-time charges, stock options, and rosy
pension assumptions.' Large institutional investors, such as
pension plans and mutual funds, undoubtedly have the
resources to fund similar past data research in their own
interest. Perhaps, following some delay, they could be
encouraged to share this information with the investing public.
A divested company serving only the lender investors will
reward high caliber past data analysis. Such rewards will
incentivize analysts to discount and expose aggressive uses of
accounting loopholes, tax havens, and options markets to
convert future earnings into current cash flows.
As an additional incentive to expose fraud, I propose
offering a small percentage of the funds recovered from fraud
as a "bounty" (perhaps with an upper limit of $1 million) to
anyone exposing material fraud in the management-certified
indicators filed by public corporations on the Internet. These
bounties can serve as a check on conflicted auditors, and may
expose big fraud faster and at a lower cost to the investing
community.
In addition to such incentive programs, the IBBS
division should be prohibited from influencing past data
research. The need for such a prohibition is exemplified by the
Parmalat scandal. In September 2002, Italian satirist Beppe
Grillo said that Parmalat had 13 billion euros in assets and 13
billion in debt. "[In a normal country, (unlike Italy) it would
collapse, bankrupt."' If a satirist could see the problem clearly
visible in Parmalat's past data a year before its bankruptcy,
why didn't regulators and professional analysts? A Merrill
Lynch analyst cited "inefficient balance sheet management"
' See Sharon Epperson, Smarter Earnings: The Quality of Profits Matters as
Much as the Amount. Here's How to Judge, TIME, Mar. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printoutO,8816,1101040308-5 9 6 15 2 ,00.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004). See also Elizabeth MacDonald, Pension Pangs: Some Big
Companies are in for an Earnings Jolt When They Own up to the Reality of Rotten
Pension Fund Performance, FORBES, Jun. 9, 2003, available at http://www.forbes.com/
freeforbes/2003/0609/140.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (noting that eventually,
unrealistic earnings assumptions catch up with sponsors).
" Daniel J. Wakin, There Were Earlier Signs of Trouble at Parmalat, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at C1.
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when Parmalat started borrowing in the bond market while
alleging large cash reserves."' Despite these reservations,
Merrill participated in Parmalat's complex financial dealings,
since Merrill made significant short-term profits from such
participation. Perhaps Merrill made the correct business
decision: short-term profits from participation were worth more
than potential losses shared among thousands of Parmalat
investors at an unknown future date. Compared to Parmalat,
the Enron story had a more blatant conflict of interest,' since
some Merrill executives were making significant personal 7
profits.
Thus, following divestiture, the ILS division will need to
search for appropriate "sell" recommendations. What better
way to select companies for sell recommendations than to turn
to those using aggressive accounting? A clear focus on past
data research, with watchful regulation, can and should
improve the quality and availability of such research after the
breakup of vendors convicted of abusive behavior.
2. Future prospects research
As the name indicates, this research involves evaluation
of the future prospects (FP) of the various goods and services
sold by a borrower. It often requires sophisticated models,
market research, detective work, interviews with competitors
and customers, and extensive study of international trends in
related products. For example, an FP research firm will be
expected to (reasonably) correctly predict, in 2000, the demand
for cell phones produced by Motorola Inc. during the first
"'Prosecutors investigating the collapse of Parmalat, the Italian milk group,
have ordered a search of the Milan offices of UBS, the Swiss bank. International banks
have come under regulatory scrutiny for helping Parmalat to place bonds and for
extending it credit." Caroline Merrell, Parmalat Investigators Raid UBS in Paper
Chase, TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at 56, available at http://business.timesonline.co.ukl
article/0,,9065-995169,00.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
' See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Merrill Lynch, Four Merrill Lynch
Executives with Aiding and Abetting Enron Accounting Fraud (Mar. 17, 2003)
(reporting that the SEC charged Merrill Lynch and four Merrill Lynch executives with
aiding and abetting Enron accounting fraud, and that Merrill Lynch simultaneously
agreed to the entry of a permanent anti-fraud injunction and to pay $80 million in
disgorgement, penalties and interest), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-32.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
87 See John R. Emshwiller & Kara Scannell, First Enron Trial Begins
Monday, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2004, at C1 (asking whether Merrill's purchase was a
sham; naming six Merrill executives including a one-time head of investment banking,
Daniel Bayly, as defendants charged with illegally manipulating Enron's books for
personal gain).
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quarter of 2004. FP research, therefore, is associated with
forecasting future demand for unseen goods using future
technologies at unknown prices in a world subject to unknown
natural or man-made disasters. Since whimsical human
reactions are involved, FP research is obviously more difficult
to conduct than weather forecasting, yet it is equally vital.
Errors in FP research cause large losses to individual investors
and misallocation of scarce national resources.
Clearly, high quality FP research for the benefit of the
general public is what economists call a public good. Some of
the $1.4 billion in fines mentioned above should help finance a
Bell Labs style non-governmental public domain entity for FP
research,' which could provide public information regarding
basic long-term trends in demography and technology and help
reduce the costs of private FP researchers. However, public
goods are subject to two problems known in economic theory as
"free rider" and "adverse selection." These concepts are used
here to derive valuable insights for the funding of FP research.
a. Free Rider and Adverse Selection
A free rider acquires the benefits of FP research without
paying for it. In any securities market, when an informed
player places orders to buy or sell securities, these orders are
recorded, and transparency rules force public entities to
disclose their trades within a prescribed time interval. The
Wall Street ticker tape for the New York Stock Exchange
tracks quantities of all buy and sell orders as they occur, for
anyone to see. It is possible to copy the buy or sell orders made
by reputed research-backed outfits without paying for the FP
research reports on which those orders are based. The profit
potential from buying a research report, therefore, is limited to
a small window during which the buyer has an advantage in
executing her buy (or sell) order before the price rises (or falls),
at which time the imitators and free riders jump in. Since the
creator or buyer of an FP research report cannot appropriate
its full benefits to himself, small investors cannot afford to buy
them.9 However, if we can somehow pay for FP research,
As a past employee of Bell Labs with considerable interest in finance, I can
help organize such an entity.
'9 Patent protection is granted to pharmaceuticals because the innovators
themselves cannot fully appropriate the benefits of the innovation. They also use
advertising and 'detailing" (i.e. wining and dining) to supplement patent protection.
See H.D. Vinod & P.M. Rao, Asymmetric Complementarity and Dynamic Optimization
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imitation is vital to the market's success in allocating adequate
resources towards things that the public wants, and denying
resources to things that the public does not.
FP research is also subject to a great deal of ex ante
uncertainty. It is human nature to seek comfort in numbers,
when faced with uncertainty. Adverse selection means that
such ex ante uncertainty encourages irrational herd behavior,'
leading investors to choose wrong investments and misallocate
capital resources.
Different public goods carry different weights of
importance in regard to the problems of free rider and adverse
selection. For example, national defense is subject to a heavy
free ridership; if the nation is safe from foreign aggression for
one person, it is safe for all. Most countries, therefore, have a
governmental department of defense. The patent system aims
to encourage production of advanced medicines and technology
by prohibiting free riders (copycats) from supplying patented
technology without paying for the research and development
creating that technology. On the other hand, since promotion of
arts and basic science is less severely affected by free riders or
adverse selection, these public goods are commonly funded
indirectly by tax deductions or with direct government
spending on a Science Foundation and an Arts Endowment, not
by establishing an independent government agency.
b. Privatization and Taxpayer Endowment
Besides being severely affected by both free rider and
adverse selection problems, FP research is also subject to two
unique features: (i) a potential for political corruption, and (ii)
an intrinsic difficulty in assessing its quality, except ex post.
Any investment project named by FP research, especially if it
sways the consensus forecast, will attract large investment
from both public and private entities. This investment in turn
will create jobs and wealth in one particular (congressional)
district rather than another. It is likely, therefore, that if a
government department provides FP research, it will be subject
to political pressures and corruption, resulting in tainted
research. Tainted research will quickly lose its credibility.
in Pharmaceuticals, 2(2) J. QUANT. ECON. 149, 149-60 (2004). Although FP researchers
would be allowed to spend modest sums on advertising, similar asymmetric
complementarity is likely to appear in FP research.
See Hong et al., supra note 45.
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Accordingly, we do not want a government department in
charge of FP research. Not only will the protection against free
ridership that an agency or department can provide (as in the
patent example) be too slow for instantly moving worldwide
financial markets, but the credibility of the department's
research will always be at issue. In light of these
disadvantages, I suggest limiting public funding to (i) financing
watchdog activities to keep FP research honest; (ii) providing
standards; (iii) providing data on long-term trends in science
and technology; and (iv) supporting activities to reduce the
costs of FP research to private providers.
Despite divestiture, FP research should remain
primarily private. Private funding is currently provided by the
research departments of brokerages, money center banks and
other vendors, financial media companies, rating companies
like Morningstar, S&P or Moody's, and institutional investors
such as large pension plans, large mutual funds like Fidelity's
Magellan and Warren Buffet's fund, and a few independent
outfits." Much of the privately funded FP research is done
exclusively for the private use of the members of the group
paying the bills.
Usually, independent FP researchers sell reports on a
specific borrower corporation or on a particular security. The
price of the report will be sensitive to the reputation of the
person or entity producing it. The market for FP research
reports is open to freelancers, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), universities, current and former employees of
corporations, and their auditors. The market price of FP
reports will function well in balancing demand and supply,
provided we keep markets competitive. If divestiture leads to a
zero contribution by the IBBS division to fund the FP research,
the ILS division should be able to buy the needed research
reports or conduct some FP research in-house, similar to
Schwab, Inc.
The second unique feature of FP research is that its
quality is impossible to judge at the time that it is produced,
and it remains generally unknown for some years. Were
taxpayers to pay for FP research which proves to be wrong,
" For example, Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) is an
independent research firm that tries to provide information on corporate governance
and social responsibility issues affecting investors and corporations since 1972,
especially to large institutional investors. See IRRC Homepage, at http://www.irrc.org/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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they would be hit with a double whammy, since by then such
research will already have penalized society through investor
losses, misallocated resources, and wasted time and effort. I
suggest that any taxpayer support should be in the form of
prizes to researchers who correctly predict FP ex post, as
determined with 20-20 hindsight. Since, by its uncertain
nature, FP researchers will be wrong one in three times
(hypothetically), the prize monies must exceed three times the
cost of research. Otherwise, the prizes will amount to bragging
rights, but will fail to incentivize on-going, high quality FP
research. If these proposals are implemented in tandem, future
prospects research should not suffer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper began with the premise that a single money
center bank or brokerage, i.e. vendor, cannot properly serve
both the buy and sell sides in financial markets without
conflicts of interest any more than one law firm can serve both
the prosecution and defense. Following a brief discussion of the
historical background of market inefficiencies and attempts to
correct them, I focus on the serious problems created by
conflicts of interest in the operation of vendors. Using defined
terms, I approach the problem from the viewpoint of economic
theory, concluding that our ultimate aim should be to facilitate
socially productive allocation of resources by market
participants through an efficiently working market for
securities.
I use a game theory payoff matrix to illustrate how
conflicts of interest are intrinsic to the structure of vendor
institutions, causing losses to society and opportunities for
subtle kickback schemes in the absence of incentives for
achieving a socially desirable Nash cooperative bargaining
solution. This matrix reveals the excess rents that entrenched
and conflicted vendors enjoy in the current corporate structure,
rents that directly hurt ordinary investors and indirectly cause
market inefficiencies. Recent examples indicate that what we
have is an inequitable, and often unethical, manipulation of
both the general public and individual analysts, which is likely
to persist under current regulations and similar
micromanagement solutions.
I make a case for divestiture of any vendor found guilty
of conflict of interest abuses into two separate companies: X-
ILS Inc. serving the savers and investors, and X-IBBS Inc.,
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mainly serving business borrowers. As reputation is an
extremely important (if not the most important) asset in
financial services entities, when vendor X is found guilty, loss
of reputation already means considerable loss of shareholder
value. Since shareholders of X will get equal shares in both X-
ILS and X-IBBS, each part will have an opportunity to rebuild
its reputation, absent any conflicts of interest. The general
public will gain from improved resource allocation and reduced
conflicts, while X's employees and executives need not lose.
One potential disadvantage to this remedy is the loss of
funding for research, currently provided by the IBBS division. I
distinguish between past data research and the more difficult
and speculative future prospects research. The former should
be made available to all investors on the Internet, published
and financed by the regulators, and supplemented by
compilation costs to borrowers and a modest fee to individual
users. Corporations are already being asked by regulators to
file accounting details well beyond the pro forma earnings, and
many such details are already being collected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and revised FASB92 accounting standards.
Such information should promptly be published on the
Internet. Companies who engage in fraudulent gamesmanship9 3
in their publicly filed earnings should be fined, with a portion
of the fine serving as a bounty.
The 1984 divestiture of the Bell System telephone
monopoly resulted in the decimation of research and
innovation. While a similar claim (that FP research might
suffer upon divestiture) is a valid concern, it is less plausible,
as FP research by a convicted vendor is most likely biased and
conflicted. Furthermore, FP research is subject to problems of
free ridership, adverse selection, and political influence. I
suggest limiting public funding to selected activities that
reduce the cost of private FP research, and turning to sources
of private funds for FP research. First, I encourage the
participation of independent providers to strengthen the
market for research reports. Second, I suggest that taxpayers
or private foundations reimburse high quality (ex post accurate)
FP research.
92 Id. "New [FASB-induced] developments are expected to capture egregious
SPEs, and provide users of financial statement with clearer information." Id.
93 See Levitt, supra note 19.
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There are fundamental reasons why regulating or
micromanaging internal operations of vendors will not work,
whereas the threat of divestiture can. If we permit violators to
continue as a single company, capital market misallocations
and inefficiencies will continue, producing more costly Enrons.
Now that the harm from this conflict of interest is identified,
the threat of a breakup should be used to deal with it quickly
and effectively. A few dramatic divestitures of violators can
eliminate the need for detailed rule enforcing, excess
regulation, and micromanaging. After all, excess regulation
might well undermine the freedom and flexibility needed by
entrepreneurs, whose risk-taking alone helps create and
sustain our enormous national wealth.
